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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4155 
___________ 
 
GEORGE A. JACKSON,  
     Appellant 
v. 
 
M.D. KEITH IVENS; PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INCORPORATED;  
STANLEY TAYLOR; STATE OF DELAWARE;  
CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC., Correctional Medical Services, Inc. 
and Correctional Medical Services of Delaware, Inc.; CARL C. DANBERG;  
JAMES C. WELSH; CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES; CORRECTIONAL 
MEDICAL SERVICES OF DELAWARE, INC.; WARDEN RICK KEARNEY; 
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-01-cv-00559) 
District Judge:  Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2014 
Before: CHAGARES, GARTH and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 30, 2014) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 George Jackson appeals the order of the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware granting Appellee Correctional Medical Services’s (CMS) motion 
for summary judgment and its order denying his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from 
summary judgment.  For the reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s orders. 
 The procedural history of this case and the details of Jackson’s claims are well 
known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s memorandum opinion, and need not 
be discussed at length.  Briefly, Jackson alleged in his counseled eighth amended 
complaint that CMS was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need and refused 
to provide adequate medical care for his sarcoidosis.  After discovery, CMS moved for 
summary judgment, and Jackson filed a counseled response.  The District Court granted 
the motion for summary judgment, and Jackson filed a pro se notice of appeal.  Jackson 
then filed a pro se motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which the District Court 
denied.  Jackson filed an amended notice of appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b) 
motion.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 Summary Judgment 
 We review the District Court’s order granting summary judgment de novo and 
review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011).  A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed 
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if our review reveals that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 In order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for denial of medical care, 
Jackson needed to show that the Appellee was deliberately indifferent to his serious 
medical needs.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).  Deliberate indifference 
can be shown by a prison official “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical 
care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”  Id. at 104-05.  A 
medical need is serious if it is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring 
treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity 
for a doctor's attention.”  Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 
F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal citation and quotation omitted).   
 CMS asserted in its motion for summary judgment that there is no curative 
treatment for sarcoidosis but that symptoms can be treated with nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs, glucocorticosteroids, antimalarial agents, and immunosuppressant 
drugs.  They noted that Jackson is seen every three months as a chronic care patient and 
has received tests to monitor his sarcoidosis.  Dr. McDonald testified at his deposition 
that Jackson did not have severe enough symptoms or involvement of any organ that 
would justify the risk of corticosteroids.  He stated that eighty percent of people with 
sarcoidosis will be fine the rest of their lives.  An outside doctor, Dr. Aponte, evaluated 
Jackson and opined that Jackson had no signs by physical examination or blood work of 
 4 
 
active sarcoidosis.  She suggested that his back pain could be secondary to degenerative 
joint disease and that he may have mild osteoarthritis of the knees.  She recommended an 
X-ray of his spine and knees.  She also agreed with his then-current treatment of 
Meloxicam and Neurotonin.  She also stated that Jackson reported that his shortness of 
breath went away after he took antibiotics. 
 In his counseled opposition to summary judgment, Jackson argued that he was 
never sent to an outside specialist or given necessary diagnostic procedures.  He claimed 
that he had suffered from back pain, breathing difficulties, and skin problems but that no 
effort was made to determine whether sarcoidosis caused these symptoms.  He also 
asserted that the sarcoidosis progressed to his liver.  However, he did not explain what 
treatment CMS could have provided which would have prevented this.  As noted above, 
Dr. Aponte opined that Jackson’s back pain could be caused by degenerative joint disease 
and noted that his breathing problems went away with antibiotics. 
 In his brief on appeal, Jackson contends that the District Court improperly 
assessed the credibility of witnesses in determining that Jackson had pointed to nothing in 
the record to rebut CMS’s argument there was no deliberate indifference to Jackson’s 
serious medical needs.  However, Jackson argued that CMS should have sent him for 
additional diagnostic tests; he did not point to any occasion when he did not receive the 
recommended treatment for his symptoms.  Because Jackson offered no evidence to 
 5 
 
dispute CMS’s evidence of the adequacy of his medical care, there was no factual dispute 
or credibility assessment for the District Court to make. 
 Jackson also argues that the District Court misinterpreted our not-precedential 
opinion in Heath v. Shannon, 442 F. App’x 712 (3d Cir. 2011).  Jackson contends that we 
held that once a serious medical need is established, no expert testimony is needed to 
show deliberate indifference.  In Heath, the District Court had determined that the 
prisoner’s perforated ulcer was a serious medical need.  However, it concluded that the 
prisoner had failed to provide expert testimony to support his claims that a physician’s 
assistant’s (PA) alleged deliberate indifference to his perforated stomach ulcer and the 
subsequent delay caused any difference in the outcome of his surgery.  In our not-
precedential opinion, we noted that an expert was not needed to determine that a 
perforated ulcer was a serious medical need but that there were genuine issues of fact as 
to whether the prisoner had told the PA of certain troubling symptoms and whether the 
delay in surgery made a difference in the outcome.  We observed that the District Court 
had not given the prisoner additional time to designate an expert.  Our opinion in Heath 
does not excuse Jackson from supporting his claims with expert evidence.  While the 
parties do not dispute that sarcoidosis is a serious medical issue, the necessary treatment 
for sarcoidosis is not obvious to a lay person.  See Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 
492, 504 (3d Cir. 2002) (“It is clear that Montgomery himself cannot explain the medical 
consequences of neglecting to conduct a scheduled cardiac catheterization for a patient 
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with heart disease.  Nor can Montgomery describe the effects upon the body of being 
denied, for prolonged periods, prescribed heart and HIV medication.  Heart disease and 
HIV, unlike, for example, broken legs or bullet wounds, do not clearly manifest 
themselves in ways that are obvious and ascertainable to a lay person.”)   
  Because we agree with the District Court that Jackson has not shown a violation 
by CMS of his constitutional right to medical care, we need not address whether he 
needed to show or has shown that the violation was the result of a policy or custom of 
CMS.  Likewise, we need not determine whether the Memo of Agreement between the 
United States Department of Justice and the State of Delaware is admissible on that issue. 
 Rule 60(b) motion 
 Under Rule 60(b)(3), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment due to 
fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.  Disposition of a motion 
under Rule 60(b) is within the discretion of the trial court, and the Court of Appeals may 
review the ruling only for an abuse of that discretion.  Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 
162 (3d Cir. 2011).  Jackson argues that he presented evidence of fraud by CMS in his 
Rule 60(b) motion.  He contends that a doctor concealed relevant medical information 
from him and CMS’s counsel concealed this information to obtain a judgment.  He 
asserts that the doctor never informed him that sarcoidosis was a possible cause for the 
findings of a 2006 liver biopsy and that the doctor told him his sarcoidosis was confined 
to his neck.  Jackson does not explain how this biopsy finding would have influenced the 
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treatment he received for his sarcoidosis or how this caused him any injury.  Moreover, 
the 2006 biopsy was mentioned in Jackson’s counseled opposition to summary judgment.  
Jackson, through his representation by counsel, was aware of the biopsy at the time of the 
summary judgment motion.  Thus, there was no fraud by CMS with respect to the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Jackson argues that the information about the liver 
biopsy would have influenced his decision to settle with other defendants earlier in the 
District Court proceedings.  However, he expressly stated in his brief on appeal that the 
settlements he reached with other defendants are not part of the appeal.  The District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s Rule 60(b) motion. 
 Motion to file supplemental brief 
 Jackson has moved for leave to file a supplemental brief.  He contends that when 
he received his medical records from his former counsel, he discovered that an ECG test 
in 2009 indicated that he had a “Sinus Rhythm Nonspecific T Wave Abnormality.”  He 
contends that CMS concealed this information to succeed with its motion for summary 
judgment.  However, Jackson does not explain the meaning or significance of this ECG 
result or how it supports a determination that he required any additional treatment. 
 Conclusion 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders granting 
summary judgment and denying Jackson’s Rule 60(b) motion.  Jackson’s motion to file a 
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supplemental brief is denied.  CMS’s motion to file a supplemental appendix is denied as 
Jackson included the necessary documents in the appendix attached to his informal brief. 
